Capital Defense Journal
Volume 11

Issue 2

Article 17

Spring 3-1-1999

Sheppard v. Taylor No. 98-12, 1998 WL 743663 (4th Cir. Oct. 23,
1998)

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
Sheppard v. Taylor No. 98-12, 1998 WL 743663 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998), 11 Cap. DEF J. 373 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol11/iss2/17

This Casenote, U.S. Fourth Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital
Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Sheppard v. Taylor
No. 98-12, 1998 WL 743663
(4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998)
L Facts'
The police found the bodies of Mr. and Mrs. Rosenbluth on November
30, 1993, inside their Chesterfield County, Virginia, home.2 Mr.
Rosenbluth had been shot twice in the face and Mrs. Rosenbluth had been
shot four times from close range and sustained additional wounds in the
head and neck.3 Although there was no sign of a struggle or forced entry,
the house had been looted and the Rosenbluth's automobiles were missing,
in addition to several of their personal belongings. 4 Evidence traced the
appellant, Mark A. Sheppard ("Sheppard"), and Andre Graham ("Graham")
to the murders.' When Sheppard was arrested, he was in possession of Mrs.
6
Rosenbluth's watch and several of Mr. Rosenbluth's credit cards.
Sheppard's fingerprint was uncovered in the Rosenbluth home and the .38
caliber handgun responsible for the infliction of Mr. Rosenbluth's wounds
and two of Mrs. Rosenbluth's wounds was linked to Sheppard.! Mrs.
Rosenbluth's remaining wounds were made by a .45 caliber automatic
weapon traced to Graham.' Autopsies indicated that the Rosenbluths had
ingested alcohol and cocaine shortly before the murders.9 The prosecution's
theory at trial was that the Rosenbluths were regular customers of Graham
and Sheppard, who were close friends and cocaine suppliers.1" The Commonwealth argued that the Rosenbluths had either failed to pay a drug debt
associated with the deals or had given the appellants some reason to believe
1. This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions" at 165 F.3d 19 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. Sheppard v. Taylor, No. 98-12, 1998 WL 743663, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998).
This decision will not be published in a printed volume.
3. Id.

4.

Id.

5.

Id

6. Id
7. Id
8. Id The Commonwealth contended at trial that while Graham shot Mrs.

Rosenbluth twice, Sheppard inflicted the fatal wounds with his two shots. Id

9. Id
10. Id.
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that they might identify them as their suppliers, and as a result, Graham and
Sheppard murdered the couple."
Sheppard was convicted of two counts of capital murder, one for the
murder of each of the Rosenbluths. 2 At the penalty trial, the prosecution
presented evidence of Sheppard's prior unadjudicated criminal conduct."
The jury found both aggravating factors available under Virginia law,
specifically (1) that Sheppard represented a future danger to society and (2)
that the Rosenbluth murders were "vile" because they involved "aggravated
battery" or "depravity of mind."14 The jury imposed a sentence of death,
which was subsequently confirmed by the trial judge."5
After unsuccessfully pursuing review of his convictions and failing to
obtain post conviction relief in the Virginia courts, Sheppard filed a petition

for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. 6 The district court denied
the petition and Sheppard appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Sheppard's major
arguments on appeal were as follows: (1) that the Supreme Court of
Virginia's failure to review his claims relating to the "future dangerousness"
factor on the basis of a technicality in wording made Virginia's appellate
review meaningless; 7 (2) that the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of prior unadjudicated conduct;" and (3)
that the trial court erred in its refusal to allow Sheppard to inform the jury
that his co-defendant, Graham, received a life sentence.19
11.

Id.

12. Id., at *2. The jury also convicted Sheppard of two counts of robbery and four
counts of using a firearm in the commission of robbery. Id, at *2 n.3.
13.
Id, at *2-3.
14.
Id., at *2.
15.
Id. Sheppard, who was executed on January 20th, was the first execution of 1999
for Virginia. VirginiaHolds FirstExecution ofthe Year, THE ROANOKE TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999,
at B4.
16.
Id
17. Id.
18.
Id., at *3.
19.
Id., at *6. A number of Sheppard's claims will not be discussed in this case note for
want of notable developments in the law. The court held Sheppard's contention that the
Commonwealth's attorney deprived him of his due process rights by making improper
closing arguments was foreclosed from review because Sheppard failed to preserve the issue
for appeal. Id., at *3. See Russo v. Commonwealth, 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (Va. 1966) (finding
that "[o]bjection to improper argument of counsel should be made at the time and the court
should be requested to instruct the jury to disregard it.... Failure to make timely objection
ordinarily constitutes a waiver") (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
Sheppard's claim that the "vileness" predicate for the death penalty is unconstitutionally vague was summarily dismissed by the court based on the rationale that Sheppard's
conviction rested on solid ground since a specific finding of the "future dangerousness" factor
was made. Sbeppard, 1998 WL 743663, at *6. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the review process in a non-weighing state, like Virginia, in the situation where an
aggravating factor has been found to be invalid:

1999]

SHEPPARD V TAYLOR
II. Holding20

The Fourth Circuit held the following: (1) Sheppard's claim that
appellate review of death sentences in Virginia is, in effect, meaningless was
procedurally defaulted; 2' (2) Sheppard's claims that the trial court erred in
In a non-wet hing State, so long as the sentencing body finds at least one valid
agravating Oactor, the fact that it also finds an invalid aggravating factor does not
infect the formal process of deciding whether death is an appropriate remedy.
Assuming a determinationby the state appellatecourt that the invalid/actorwould
not have made a difference to the jury 'sdetermination there is no constitutional
violation resulting-from the introduction of the invafid factor in an earlier stage
of the proceedings.
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1992) (emphasis added). This language strongly
suggests that, in all states, death sentences based in part on invalid aggravators cannot be
automatically salvaged by the existence of a valid factor. Remand, at least for harmless error
analysis, is required.
Based on Sheppard's admission that he was in the Rosenbluth's house at the time of the
murder, the fact that the murder weapon was linked to Sheppard as recently as six days prior
to the murder, and other witness testimony, Sheppard's contention that there was insufficient
evidence to identify him as the triggerman was rejected by the Fourth Circuit. Sheppard,
1998 WL 743663, at *7.
Finally, the court held Sheppard's ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be without
merit, finding an absence of unprofessional error on the part of defense counsel. Id. Note
that one of these defaulted claims was based upon defense counsel referring to Sheppard as
a "predator." Referring to one's client as a "predator" may not be ineffective assistance of
counsel in the Fourth Circuit. But cf Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 628-29 (10th Cir.
1988) (finding counsel ineffective in part because of his reference to the defendant as a
"shark[] feeding in the ocean in a frenzy; something that's just animal in all aspects").
However, it is always unprofessional to violate one's duty to advocatefor one's client.
20. On January 19, 1999, the Fourth Circuit granted Sheppard's motion for expedited
appeal and affirmed the dismissal of Sheppard's action. Sheppard v. Early, No. 99-6048, 1999
WL 30642 (4th Cir. Jan. 19, 1999) (the opinion, originally a nonpublished opinion, was
amended to be published in mid-February). Sheppard challenged the constitutionality of
section 53.1-232.1 of the Virginia Code on equal protection grounds. Sheppard, 1999 WL
30642, at *1. Section 53.1-232.1 requires that an execution date be set within sixty to seventy
days following the denial of habeas relief by the Fourth Circuit. Id., at *2. Because Rule 13
of the Rules of the United States Supreme Court provides for a ninety-day period following
a decision by a court of appeals in which to file a timely petition for certiorari, Sheppard
argued that the Virginia statute deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection. Id. The court of appeals, employing the "rational basis" test, found that section
53.1-232.1 is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Id., at *2-3. The court
held that Virginia has a legitimate state interest in "the finality of its criminal judgments and
in executing sentence on those determined by state law to be the most serious offenders." Id.,
at *3.
Although the equal protection challenge to section 53.1-232.1 was unsuccessful,
Sheppard's attorneys also considered pursuing an attack based upon the Supremacy Clause.
See 28 U.S.C.A. 5 2101(c) (West 1994) (codifying Rule 13 of the Rules of the United States
Supreme Court which states that applications for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court
should be filed within ninety days ater judgment is entered). Defense counsel are encouraged to object to the time frame used to set an execution date under section 53.1-232.1 on this
ground.
21.
Sheppard, 1998 WL 743663, at *2.
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admitting various pieces of evidence regarding his prior unadjudicated
conduct, thereby depriving Sheppard of his constitutional rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, were either procedurally defaulted or
failed on the merits;22 and (3) the trial court did not err in its decision to
exclude evidence that Sheppard's co-defendant received a life sentence from
the penalty phase of the trial.2"
II. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Meaningless Appellate Review of FutureDangerousnessFinding
Sheppard made several claims relating to the trial court's admission of
evidence of his prior unadjudicated conduct during the sentencing trial.2 4
The Supreme Court of Virginia held these claims to be procedurally defaulted although they were all related to the finding of the future dangerousness factor because defense counsel failed to make a general assignment of
error to the finding of future dangerousness.2" Sheppard argued that the
finding of procedural default was inadequate to foreclose federal habeas
corpus review because it has not been "consistently or regularly applied."26
The court seemed to agree with Sheppard's claim, stating that "Sheppard
facially complied with Rules 5:17(c) and 5:22(b) by raising an assignment of
error directed at each of the types of evidence that he now argues were
unconstitutionally admitted. ...[I]t appears that a persuasive argument can
be made that Sheppard cannot be deemed to have been appraised of the
requirement in time to bring his actions into compliance with it."27 However, the court went on to find all of the specific claims either defaulted for
other reasons or without merit.28
Although the Fourth Circuit seemed to reject the bizarre default rule
applied by the Supreme Court of Virginia, it did so because Sheppard was
the first to fall victim to this rationale. That leaves the question of whether
counsel are now required to include general objections along for every
specific one. The answer is probably "yes."
22.
Id., at *4.
23.
Id., at *6.
24.
Id., at *3.
25.
Id Note that Sheppard specifically objected to the admissibility of (1) evidence
concerning his participation in a motel robbery and shooting; (2) evidence concerning his
participation in a robbery that involved a murder and a maiming; (3) the maiming victim's
testimony; (4) the testimony of Maurice Turner, a fellow inmate, concerning Sheppard's
statements about his involvement in as many as ten additional murders in Richmond,
Virginia; and (5) the testimony of Lonnie Athens, a criminologist who offered his opinion
concerning Sheppard's future dangerousness. Id
26.
Id, at *4 (citing Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988)).
27. Id.
28.
Id
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In Kasi v. Commonwealth,29 the defense raised ninety-two assignments
of error on direct appeal30 This approach is to be encouraged; Sheppard
illustrates why. Currently, there are a number of unresolved issues with
respect to future dangerousness evidence and the process by which that
factor is proven; included among these issues are the following claims: (1)
the term "future dangerousness" is too vague for the defense to adequately
defend against it; (2) defense had insufficient notice of unadjudicated acts; (3)
Brady v. Maryland" and Kyles v. Wbitley" require full disclosure of all
favorable evidence related to mitigation and credibility of witnesses related
to unadjudicated acts; (4) evidence introduced of unadjudicated acts was
irrelevant;"3 (5)an inappropriate standard of proof was used to determine the
existence of future dangerousness; and (6) the Commonwealth misled the
defense as to what the future dangerousness evidence would be. 4
B. Admissibility of Co-Defendant's Life Sentence
Sheppard contended that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to present evidence in mitigation by preventing him from
informing the jury that his co-defendant, Graham, received a life sentence
for his participation in the Rosenbluths' murders." Citing Eddings v.
Oklahoma,3 6 the Fourth Circuit noted that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require the sentencer to have access to "any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.""
However, the court concluded that a co-defendant's sentence is "neither an
aspect of the defendant's character or record nor a circumstance of the
29.
508 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998).
30.
See Douglas R. Banghart, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 437 (1999) (analyzing Kasi v.
Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998)).
31.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
32.
514 U.S. 419 (1995).
33. Motions in limine should be employed to exclude this evidence; objections to their
denial, properly federalized, form the basis for appeal.
34. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 166 (1996) (although the case was remanded
for a determination as to whether petitioner raised the claim that the prosecution deliberately
misled him regarding what evidence of unadjudicated acts would be presented at trial was
defaulted, the Court recognized the potential merits of the claim), on remand, Gray v.
Netherland, 99 F.3d 158, 164 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding Gray's claim to be procedurally
defaulted and lacking prejudice, emphasizing the fact that the Commonwealth provided
sufficient notice by disclosing the evidence it intended for proof of future dangerousness to
the defense the day before the sentencing trial commenced).
35. Sheppard, 1998 WL 743663, at *6.
36. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
37. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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offense" and denied Sheppard's claim." In so doing, the court noted that
Sheppard failed to point to any United States Supreme Court precedent
holding that all reasonable jurists would conclude that a co-defendant's
sentence is mitigating evidence.39
Despite the court's holding in Sheppard, this question is still open.
While the United States Supreme Court has not specifically held that a codefendant's sentence is mitigating evidence, it also has not held that a codefendant's sentence is not mitigating evidence. Current law does not
suggest that such evidence is inadmissible. Relative blame is a recognized
factor relevant to the appropriateness of a death sentence.4" It is important
to remember that trial court judges retain the discretion to admit such
evidence.4
Alix M. Karl

38. Sheppard, 1998 WL 743663, at *6.
39. IL
40. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784-85 (1987) (noting that counsel's failure to
pursue a "lesser culpability argument to the jury may be sufficient to constitute the basis of
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). See also VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Michie Supp.
1998) (noting that comparative consideration of both the crime and the defendant is required
of an adequate proportionality review of a death sentence).
41. For a more thorough analysis of the potential role of the co-defendant's sentence
in mitigation, see Alix M. Karl, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 379 (1999) (analyzing Ward v.
French, No. 98-7, 1998 WL 743664 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998)).

